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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
dealing with land contracts5 and insurance premiums6 which hold that a
vendor who accepts default installment payments waives the contractual pro-
vision for payment on time. Acceptance of default payments, accompanied by
protest against default, will not waive the right to rescind.; Generally speak-
ing, after a condition of payment of installments on time has been eliminated
by a mere waiver, it can be re-established by giving a definite notice to the
debtor which specifies that installments must be paid as originally agreed. s
The larger portion of litigation concerning waiver of installment payments
appears in the context of insurance cases where the insurer who knowingly
accepts overdue premiums is deemed to waive prompt payment and is estop-
ped from forfeiting the policy.9 Any unequivocal act of an insurer indicating
an intention to waive a right is sufficient.10 Even a non-waiver agreement,
whether contained in the policy or existing separately, may be waived by acts
or conduct.i It appears forfeitures are not favored by the law, and the right
to forfeiture of an insurance policy for late payment of premiums will be
deemed waived if reasonably possible under the circumstances of the case. 1"
Georgia's stature on "quasi new agreements"' 3 appears to be somewhat
more definite than the comparable provisions of the North Dakota Code dealing
with waiver by a creditor after acceptance of default payments.1 4 North
Dakota has held that a policy condition prescribing forfeiture may be waived
by the insurer, as such waiver is regarded as being for the benefit of the
insurer. 1
5
Whether there has been a waiver in North Dakota nevertheless depends
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.1 6 With no case law
on point, it would seem probable that the degree of default in payment of in-
stallments would have to be somewhat greater in North Dakota than in
Georgia to establish a waiver in view of the difference in the language of
the statutes.
JAMES D. SCHLOSSER.
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - EFFECT OF DEVISE "To A FOR LIFE AND THEN
TO His ISSuE." - The testator's will gave his son A an equitable life estate in
certain property and then provided that at A's death the property should pass
5. Laffon v. Collins, 212 Cal. 750, 300 Pac. 808 (1931); Porter v. Harrington, 262
Mass. 203, 159 N.E. 530 (1928); Sliwinski v. Gootstein, 234 Mich. 74, 208 N.W. 47
(1926); Bommelyn v. Moss, 121 N.J. Eq. 551, 197 Ati. 6 1938); Scott v. Molter, 119
S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
6. Bruzas v. Peerless -Casualty Co., II1 Me. 308, 89 Atl. 199 (1913).
7. Beltinok v. Tacoma Theater Co., 61 Wash. 132, 111 Pac. 1045 (1910).
8. Mintle v. Sylvester, 202 Iowa 1128, 211 N.W. 367 (1926); Smith v. Carleton, 185
Ore. 672, 205 P.2d 160 (1949).
9. Floyd v. Life Casualty Ins. Co., 148 S.W.2d 620 (Mo.App. 1941); Home Bene-
ficial Ass'n v. Field, 162 Va. 63, 173 S.E. 370 (1934).
10. McDonald v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 185 Iowa 1008, 169 N.W. 352 (1918);
Sjoberg v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n of Des Moines, 78 N.D. 179, 189, 48 N.W.2d 452, 457
(1951); Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Ellas, 185 Tr-x. 526, 147 S.W. 1152 (1912).
11. Marblestone v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 169 Minn. 1, 210 N.W. 385 (1926).
12. Page v. Washington Mut. Life Ass'n, 20 Cal.2d 234, 125 P.2d 20 (1942), Contra
Clifton v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 N.C. 499, 84 S.E. 817 (1915).
13. See Note 1 supra.
14. N.D. Rev. Code § 9-1218 (1943) "The creditor must make objections to the mode
of an offer performance at the time it is made to him. If this is not done, any objection
which could have obviated at that time is waived by his failure to make the same."
15. Sioberg v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n of Des Moines, 78 N.D. 179, 48 N.W.2d 452
(1951).
16. Ibid.
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to "his [A's] issue absolutely." At his death A was survived by two sons, B
and C, and a grandson, D, the son of B. D's guardian ad litem contended that
D was a descendant of A as much as his father and uncle. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the estate be distributed in equal shares to the
surviving children of the life tenant, this excluding D from the distribution.
Two dissenting justices argued that B, C, and D should share the estate equally.
Clarke v. Clarke, 159 A.2d 362 (Md. 1960).
The court was careful to point out that no extrinsic or intrinsic evidence of
the testator's actual intent was present.1 Viewed in this light, the decision
is contrary to numerous adjudications in other states2 as well as to the result
reached in the English courts. 3 These latter adjudicaions are based on the
view that the word "issue," when standing unqualified, is a word of pur-
chase and means "descendants." Hence it is held that descendants, of what-
ever generation, take per capita. In the instant case, both the court and the
parties agreed that the word "issue" was a word of purchase 4 rather than
limitation, meaning that the beneficiaries took as a class and were not limited
to the first taker. The crucial issue was as to membership in the chtss and on
this point the dissent relied on Maryland decisions following or purporting to
follow the English rule.
5
The view adopted by the Maryland court represents an adherence to a
so-called "minority rule" first established by the Massachusetts Court in 1891
in Jackson v. Jackson.6 The rule of the Jackson case was adopted in 1941 in the
Restatement,7 as follows: "When a conveyance creates a class gift by a limita-
tion in favor of a group described as the 'issue of B' . . . distribution is made
to such members of the class as would take, and in such shares as they
would receive, under the applicable law of intestate succession if B had died
intestate on the date of the final ascertainment of the membership in the class,
owning the subject matter of the class gift."
In recent years the trend of the cases in other states has been strongly in
favor of the rule of the Restatement. In several instances courts have over-
ruled or repudiated earlier decisions favoring the English rule. States in
which this has been done include Pennsylvania,8 Rhode Island, 9 and Minne-
sota.' 0 Although North Dakota has no case specifically dealing with the ques-
1. Cf. U.S. v. 654.8 Acres of Land, 102 F.Supp. 937 (E.D. Tenn. 1952) (slight evi-
dence of intent sufficient to avoid rule in Wild's Case).
2. Dolbeare v. Dolbeare, 124 Conn, 286, 199 AtI. 555 (1938); Hoyt v. Orcutt, 1
N.J. 454, 64 A.2d 212 (1949); McCoy v. Lewis, 166 Okla. 245, 27 P.2d 350 (1933);
Lucas v. Shumpert, 192 S.C. 208, 6 S.E.2d 17 (1939); see Wright v. City of Tuscaloosa,
236 Ala. 374, 182 So. 72, 75 (1938); Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632,
638 (1953); Morse v. Osborne, 75 N.H. 487, 77 Atl. 403, 404 (1910); Cochrel v. Robin-
son, 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871, 874 (1925); In re Uihlein's Estate, 269 Wis.
170, 68 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1955).
3. Davenport v. Hanbury, Ves. 257, 30 Eng. Rep. 999 (Ch. 1796).
4. "Purchase" is defined in Shelley v. Cramer, I Co. Rep. 93b, 72 Eng. Rep. 490
(1581) as to "Take by an act of gift, conveyance or devise, rather than by descent or
escheat."
5. In re Clarke's Will, 198 Md. 266, 81 Atl. 640 (1951); Goldsborough v. Martin, 41
Md. 488 (1875).
6. 153 Mass, 374, 26 N.E. 1112 (1891).
7. Restatement, Property § 303 (1) (1941).
8. In re Mayhew's Estate, 307 Pa. 84, 160 Atl. 724 (1932).
9. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v. Bridgham, 42 R.I. 161, 106 AtI. 149
(1919).
10. In re Thompson's Estate, 202 Minn. 648, 279 N.W. 574 (1938).
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tion, it is submitted that the result in this jurisdiction ought to follow that
of the principal case."
DAVID D. GORDON.
WILLS - REVOCATION AND REVIVAL - SUBSEQUENT WILL. - Testatrix made
two wills, one subsequent to the other, and left them in custody of a bank.
In the second will she expressly revoked the first will. Prior to her death she
withdrew the second will from the bank with intent to change it, leaving the
first will at the bank. After her death the second will could not be found
and consequently was presumed destroyed. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held, two justices dissenting, that the first will was not revoked by the subse-
quent will. The dissent felt that the revocation became effective the moment
the second will was executed. Timberlake v. State-Planters Bank of Com-
merce and Trusts, 115 S.E.2d 39 (Va. 1960).
In absence of statutes, there is great divergence of opinion among the
American cases as to when a revocation by a subsequent will becomes effec-
tive.1 Basically there are three views in this country governing this question:
(1) the common law or revival theory, (2) the ecclesiastical or intent idea,
and (3) the English or anti-revival view which was adopted by statute in
England and in nearly one-half of the states.
2
The common law view is based on the theory that a will is ambulatory
until death and that any subsequent revocation is not effective until the death
of the testator. 3 It has been said that this view is the weight of authority,'
however there are cases to the contrary.5 The defect in this view is that the
will revoked may be revived contrary to the intention of the testator. 6
The ecclesiastical rule says the question of whether or not a revocation of
a later will revives the former is a matter of intent and that there is no
presumption adverse to or in favor of revival. 7 This theory is derived from
the basic principles in all will's cases, that of ascertaining the intention of
the testator. 8 As expressed by Roscoe Pound in 19039 "it [ecclesiastical rule]
has the support of the weight of recent authority in America."
The English rule is exemplified by decisions stating that because of statute,
subsequent revocation becomes effective immediately upon execution, and to
11. Although N.D. Cent. Code § 47-09-14 provides that "When a future interest is
limited by a grant to take effect on the death of any person without heirs, or heirs of
his body, without issue, or in equivalent words, such words must be taken to mean suc-
cessors or issue living at the death of the person named as ancestor . . ." this would
not seem to be conclusive of the issue. Restatement, Property § 292 (1941) uses a broad
definition of "issue" and "descendants" but adds the observation that descendants may be
excluded from sharing in a distribution under the rule slated in § 303. See, also comment
e to this section.
1. ATKINSON, WILLS § 92 (2d ed. 1953).
2. See 28 Calif. L. Rev. 265 (1940).
3. Whitehill v. Halbing, 98 Conn. 21, 118 At. 454 (1922); Bates v. Hacking, 28 R.I.
523, 68 Atl. 622 (1908).
4. In re Gould's Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 Atl. 1082 (1900).
5. Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N.W. 901 (1911); Williams v. Miles, 68
Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 705 (1903).
6. Bates v. Hacking, 28 R.I. 523, 68 Al. 622, 625 (1908).
7. Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 705 t1903); Wrinkle v. Williams, 37
Tenn. App. 27, 260 S.W.2d 304 (1953).
8. Ewell v. Rucker, 28 Tenn. App. 156, 187 S.W.2d 644 (1945).
9. Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N.W. 705 708 (1903).
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